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LEGISLATIVE LIAISON

84-24071

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

"Defense Attache" Article on KAL-007 Flight

FROM:

EPS/LG/
2D45 HQ

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

2 Jul 84

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1.

C/EPS/LG

2 JUL 1984

AB

2.

ADC/EPS

3 JUL 1984

CR

3.

C/EPS

3 JUL 1984

C

4.

EPS/LG

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A-3

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OLL

7B24 HQ

5 July 84

11.

OLL File

9 July 84

EJ

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM
J-79

610

USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS

GPO : 1983 O - 411-632

DD/084-1076

3 July 1984

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: OLL,
25X1 FROM: EPS/LG,
SUBJECT: "Defense Attache" Article on
KAL-007 Flight

The attached DO response to Congressman Edward P. Boland's request for an analysis of the subject article deals with the speculation that the article is part of a Soviet disinformation campaign. The DDS&T has the expertise to address the issues in the article dealing with satellites and related technology and we suggest you task them with that portion of the Congressman's question. The DDI should also be asked for an analysis of the article if Congressman Boland wishes a comprehensive reply.

25X1

Attachment

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

The "Defense Attache" article reviving previously made charges of U.S. culpability for the KAL disaster, coinciding with the publication in Japan of two books on the issue which also accuse the U.S. of responsibility for the incident, must be seen as part of Soviet active measures (disinformation) campaign which has accelerated in momentum since at least the beginning of 1984. It can also be viewed as an effort on the part of the Soviet military to reburnish an image tarnished by its fumbling and near failure to bring down KAL-007 within Soviet airspace.

An intensification of anti-U.S. active measures appears to have been decided upon during the short Andropov reign. This campaign is now gaining in momentum. A few examples illustrate its range and intensity:

- o The general and unprecedented personal attack against President Reagan
- o The recent surfacing of an outdated requirements list which reveals U.S. Government interest in European developments
- o The concoction of a letter from the U.S. Ambassador in Vienna to the Austrian Defense Minister implying U.S. insensitivity to Austrian neutrality
- o In Latin America, fabrications published in a Peruvian newspaper that the U.S. is supplying Chilean armed forces with cruise missiles (paralleling similar charges published in an Indonesia newspaper of U.S. intentions to install strategic missiles in Korea, Pakistan and Japan)
- o Allegation of U.S. chemical warfare in El Salvador
- o In Asia, parallel allegations of American supply of chemical warfare material to Afghan rebels and incitement of the Sikhs in India
- o Circulation of a fabricated USIA questionnaire in several of the Asian countries

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- o In Africa, charges of U.S. complicity in: an abortive coup the air defense forces attempted in Ghana, and the economic destabilization of Nigeria; military assistance to South Africa; and involvement, together with South Africa, in incursions into Angola.

Evidence of ultimate Soviet sourcing, as in all cleverly executed Soviet active measures, is, of course, circumstantial. Nevertheless, there are a number of strong indices: the almost simultaneous resurrection of the KAL story in Japan smacks of Soviet coordination. The quick replay of the "Defense Attache" account (in Karachi, for example, on 18 June) is also characteristic of Soviet active measures exploitation.

The surest evidence that the article came from the pen of a non-English-speaking writer is the convoluted style, scrambled syntax, and the many grammatical errors. One reviewer of the article found it reminiscent of the stilted, overly formalistic style of Soviet military publications with which he was very familiar. Awkward vocabulary and misplacement of adverbs and clauses are found on every page. A few examples: "This event not only demolished the Paris meeting" (page 1); "Where, over the entire globe, was the suspect Ferrett satellite at this time?" (page 2); "On 19 January 1964, a satellite...of undisclosed identity" and "a publicly announced climate of disgrace," "had departed from the effective horizon," "comparative, parallel to but 500 km to the west," (all on page 3); "promptly to obey the signals to land," "the Korean flightpath of the airliner," etc. We could cite many more examples. More incriminating:

A. The picture captions on page 2 run from right to left, a sequence often, though not invariably, found in Russian texts.

B. On the last page of the article, second line of the left hand column, a sentence reads "...to leave tens of names in obscurity," rather than "dozens of names."

C. Another indication of the writer's non-native English is the reference to the United States as "USA," not "U.S." In Russian, when referring to the country in abbreviation, the letters "SSHA" are always used. Never does one employ "SSH."

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As to substance, the article is a thicket of technical data. A point-by-point refutation is extremely difficult; however, at one point (on page 6) the article takes a curious twist when it refers to the "relaxed" Soviet reaction to the Kamchatka intrusion. The passage continues that the Soviets showed much keener concern when Sakhalin was approached, implying that Kamchatka peninsula is devoid of sensitive military installations. Given the location of the major military naval base of Petropavlovsk on the peninsula, this line of argumentation rings false. It is possibly self-serving, as a probable effort on the part of the military to deflect the charge of incompetence for allowing the Korean plane to fly over and escape from the peninsula unchallenged and unharmed by the air defense forces.

With respect to the magazine itself, we have been apprised by our British colleagues that it is owned by Diplomatic Associates, Ltd., of London, was founded in 1960, and is published six times a year. It is available on subscription and on a controlled basis to senior procurement staffs in defense ministries and related establishments worldwide. It is considered to be a normally reputable publication which usually researches articles carefully.

We are further informed that the British Ministry of Defense was aware of the article, its content, and the possibility of its publication. The Ministry took unsuccessful informal steps to discourage the editor from publication.

Conclusion: The KAL incident had a disastrous effect upon the credibility of the Soviet Union on the international arena. It represents one of the sharpest propaganda defeats the Soviets have suffered in recent times. The implementation of counteractions to neutralize the damage must have been high on the priority list of the KGB active measures and disinformation specialists. Indeed, the KGB must have thought the story of such critical importance as to risk the compromise of a sensitive placement asset.

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